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# An American Military Organization or a European Political Alliance? Israeli Views of NATO

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“Israel is NATO—we are the West. We are the same.”  
Benjamin Netanyahu, 2007

## Introduction

In a January 2016 national survey of Israeli attitudes toward Europe and the European Union (EU), 45 percent of those surveyed supported the idea of Israel joining the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) as a full member, simply because NATO countries would help Israel defend itself.<sup>1</sup> Yet, despite this wide public support, NATO has never obtained a central place in Israeli foreign policy, security, political, and social discourse. One of the reasons for this lack of centrality has to do with Israeli perceptions of the Alliance, the three most salient of which are explored in this article. By providing empirical findings concerning the attitudes of Israeli public opinion, and that of the political and military elites, this article offers insights into the overall assessment on the part of key Israeli stakeholders of NATO’s global and regional actorness.

## A Brief History of Israeli–NATO Relations

The security climate into which Israel was born meant that from the outset, the country’s leaders were concerned with seeking recognition and legitimacy in the

world as a way of breaking out of the political and diplomatic isolation imposed on the nascent state by its Arab neighbors. To this end, Israel explored joining major international organizations, including even the European Economic Community (EEC).<sup>2</sup> Although Prime Minister David Ben-Gurion was ultimately most interested in developing a security alliance with the United States—especially following the 1956 Sinai Campaign—other frameworks were considered as well, including the European Defense Community and NATO.

In mid-1957, Ben-Gurion dispatched Shimon Peres, then director-general of the Israeli Ministry of Defense, and Reuven Shiloah, Ben-Gurion's personal adviser and the first director of the Mossad, to several European NATO member countries in order to explore the possibility of Israel's membership in the Alliance. The prospects, as the two Israeli officials were soon to discover, were dim. As NATO Secretary-General Paul-Henri Spaak explained to them, accession into the Alliance would be a real diplomatic challenge for Israel for multiple reasons. Israel's bid to join the organization would need to be approved by all member countries—a high bar for any aspiring candidate country to clear, and a particularly high one for Israel. Yet for Israel, joining NATO would also raise a particular security dilemma, since NATO's treaty agreement with the Central Treaty Organization (CENTO, also known as the "Baghdad Pact")<sup>3</sup> required member countries in both organizations to refrain from any policy or action hostile to any other. Given Israel's relations with Iraq and Pakistan, two of the five founding members of CENTO, its accession into NATO would have involved considerable difficulties for both organizations.

Following further meetings with European foreign ministers, Peres and Shiloah concluded that it was unrealistic for Israel to join the Alliance at that time. They returned to Israel with the recommendation that Jerusalem refrain from seeking to join NATO, and that it also be cognizant of the regional complexities pertaining to such membership.<sup>4</sup>

And yet, while Israel's efforts to establish formal relations with the Alliance during these early years came to naught, it successfully developed bilateral relations with individual NATO member countries, particularly France and the US.<sup>5</sup> The 1967 and the 1973 wars sowed deep divisions within NATO member countries concerning Israel.<sup>6</sup> In the face of American support for Israel, especially during the 1973 war, NATO's European Community (EC) member countries sought to carve out a distinct and common stance toward the Middle East. In a series of political declarations on the Middle East conflict, they voiced growing criticism of Israeli policies in the territories that Israel had occupied in the 1967 war, adopted a pro-Arab position, and endorsed the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) and the right of the Palestinians to national self-determination.<sup>7</sup> The pro-Arab European political declarations throughout the 1970s and the '80s cast a large shadow over Israeli relations with NATO EC members. Among the many manifestations of the strain

in relations was that Israel vigorously opposed all attempts by NATO EC members to play any role in the Middle East Peace Process (MEPP)—opposition that only eased with the convening of the Madrid Peace Conference in October 1991.<sup>8</sup>

The 1990s saw two major turning points in Israeli–NATO relations. First, with the end of the Cold War, Israel also started developing strong relations with Central European countries and former member states of the Warsaw Pact.<sup>9</sup> Second, in 1994, NATO launched its Mediterranean Dialogue (MD), the Alliance’s regional framework for security cooperation between the allies and seven non-NATO countries in the Mediterranean region, and invited Israel (as well as Algeria, Egypt, Jordan, Mauritania, Morocco, and Tunisia) to join.

Since then, and especially over the past decade, Israel and NATO have grown closer, established stronger ties, and deepened their cooperation.<sup>10</sup> Yet, underlying these relations are perceptions that, if not addressed, could undermine the future development of this growing partnership.

### **Israel’s Major Perceptions of NATO**

Currently, three major Israeli perceptions, widely shared by both the general public and the political and military elites, affect Israeli attitudes toward NATO and influence Israeli policies vis-à-vis the Alliance.

#### *Public Opinion*

The most fundamental Israeli perception of NATO—as mentioned at the outset—is that the Alliance represents a hospitable framework for Israeli accession, and therefore that Israel could and should join NATO within the foreseeable future. This perception is consistently popular, and occasionally appears to gain ground. In the KAS and Pardo 2009 national survey of Israeli attitudes toward the EU, NATO, and their members, 54 percent of those surveyed generally supported the possibility of Israel joining NATO.<sup>11</sup> In my 2011 national survey, an overwhelming majority of 69 percent of the Israeli public generally supported the possibility of Israel joining NATO. In addition, 43 percent held a favorable view of the Alliance. Two years later, in my 2013 national survey, 58 percent of the Israeli public supported Israeli membership in the Alliance, and in my 2014 survey that figure rose to 61 percent. Finally, our most recent national survey, from January 2016, saw a drop from the previous surveys, with 45 percent of Israelis supporting Israeli membership in the Alliance.<sup>12</sup>

An additional perception, which can be seen as going hand in hand with the first, is that NATO should be involved in the MEPP and should send troops to the region in a peacekeeping capacity. In the KAS and Pardo 2009 survey, 54 percent of the

respondents supported the idea that NATO should send such forces to the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. In the 2011 survey, a majority of 64 percent of Israelis supported the idea. In 2013, 58 percent of the general public supported the presence of NATO forces in the Occupied Territories; in 2014 that figure dropped slightly to 55 percent.

The third fundamental perception is dissonant with the other two and reveals the deep lack of understanding on the part of the Israeli public of what NATO is: The organization is not perceived as a Euro-Atlantic alliance, but rather either as an American-led military organization that employs political instruments or as a European-led political group of nations that also uses hard power. In my 2014 survey, 54 percent of Israelis did not know that the organization is a Euro-Atlantic alliance; 23 percent considered the Alliance to be European, 7 percent considered it to be American, and 24 percent either refused to answer the question or were sure that none of the answers to the question was correct.

### *Political and Military Elites and Policy Makers*

At the political level, a number of Israeli leaders share the popular perception that Israel could and should join NATO within the foreseeable future. In 2006, many years after Ben-Gurion's failed attempt to join NATO in the 1950s, the Israeli government started looking into the possibility of NATO membership again. The main impetus behind the move was the desire to establish more effective deterrence in the face of Iran's nuclear program. To that end, an Israeli interministerial committee drafted a position paper that included guidelines and a strategy for turning Israel into a full-fledged NATO member. The paper was presented in February 2007 to Prime Minister Ehud Olmert for his approval, but never materialized into an official Israeli policy.

For Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, Israel and NATO are closely identified. As he put it in 2007, "Israel is NATO—we are the West. We are the same."<sup>13</sup> That year, Vice Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs Tzipi Livni stated that "NATO and Israel are natural partners and strategic allies. . . . Western civilization and the Atlantic community, which NATO defends, are Israel's natural habitat."<sup>14</sup>

Similarly, Avigdor Liberman has been a vociferous advocate for Israel's accession to NATO. In January 2007, for instance, when serving as deputy prime minister and minister for strategic affairs, Liberman declared that "Israel's diplomatic and security goal . . . must be clear: joining NATO and entering the EU." Speaking to Israel Radio, he dismissed suggestions that joining NATO would compromise Israel's freedom of action in fighting terrorism. "There is no doubt that membership in NATO would still afford us 100 percent freedom in military activity," he said.<sup>15</sup> Likewise, Liberman's party platform ahead of the 2009 general elections

stated that “[o]ne of the clear goals of Yisrael Beytenu is Israel’s joining the [EU] and NATO. ... We can achieve this goal in the near future and should make every effort to make it come about.”<sup>16</sup>

Support for Israeli accession to NATO can also be heard within the world Jewish community. In 2011, World Jewish Congress President Ronald S. Lauder declared in *Die Welt* that “European NATO member states ... must admit the State of Israel into the Western Alliance.” Such admission, Lauder explained, “would send a strong signal to other countries not to take on Israel. ... Not to send such a signal ... will be perceived by the enemies of the West as an encouragement to further intensify their assault on the Jewish State.”<sup>17</sup>

It is worth noting that some leaders, politicians, and high-ranking military officials in the Euro-Atlantic community also support the idea of Israel becoming a full NATO member. Thus, for instance, former Spanish Prime Minister José Aznar has been an active voice in the Euro-Atlantic region promoting the idea of Israel’s accession to NATO. In his January 2006 speech at the headquarters of *The Wall Street Journal*, Aznar called for far-reaching NATO reforms, including the accession of Israel, Japan, and Australia. Since then, Aznar has become a leading activist for Israeli membership.<sup>18</sup>

In March 2007, the US House of Representatives adopted a resolution supporting Israeli membership in NATO, and on July 9, 2008, the House Committee on Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on Europe, together with the Subcommittee on the Middle East and South Asia, held a joint hearing calling for full Israeli membership in NATO.<sup>19</sup>

The perception that NATO should be involved in the MEPP and should send troops to the region in a peacekeeping capacity is almost as old as the conflict itself. As early as 1957, the American politician and diplomat Adlai Stevenson proposed a major NATO role in the MEPP along with the deployment of NATO forces along Arab–Israeli borders.<sup>20</sup> Since then, this idea has been frequently raised, especially at times of crisis in the Middle East. In February 2005, during the first-ever visit of a NATO secretary-general to Israel, Jaap de Hoop Scheffer officially laid down the necessary preconditions for any NATO involvement in the MEPP. The secretary-general conditioned such involvement on several requirements, first and foremost the agreement of “a lasting peace” between Israelis and Palestinians. In addition, “the parties concerned must be in favor of a NATO role in its implementation; and there would have to be a UN [United Nations] mandate.”<sup>21</sup>

As for Israel, while traditionally its leadership has scoffed at the idea of international/NATO peacekeepers in its region, in recent years some key members of

the Israeli political and military elites have started sharing the general public's perception that NATO should be involved in the MEPP.

In early 2005, the Israeli National Security Council considered the idea of stationing NATO forces at the Rafah Crossing Point, and since then NATO involvement has been openly discussed by Israeli leaders. Following the 2006 Lebanon War between Israel and Hizbullah, for instance, the Israeli government examined the probability of the deployment of NATO forces in Southern Lebanon. At the time, Israeli Defense Minister Amir Peretz publicly admitted that Israel would like to see a temporary international force, preferably headed by NATO, deployed along the Lebanese border.

In January 2007, Liberman presented to US Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice his plan for "the elimination of terror from the Gaza Strip," according to which "Israel will have to intervene in Gaza, but once it is out NATO will have to deploy 30,000 soldiers in the Strip so that Gaza can remain under control."<sup>22</sup> Five months later, Liberman already "negotiated" this plan with then-NATO Deputy Secretary-General Alessandro Minuto-Rizzo,<sup>23</sup> and by the end of that year, in October 2007, Liberman published his principles for a permanent agreement between Israelis and Palestinians. According to Liberman, "if the Palestinians will not be able to establish an effective security apparatus to put an end to terror activities, NATO will fill this vacuum."<sup>24</sup>

During Operation Protective Edge in Gaza, in August 2014, the Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs proposed to the Israeli cabinet, yet again, that NATO forces be deployed in Gaza to "monitor rehabilitation and prevent the rearming of Hamas and other groups." The Israeli *Haaretz* daily reported that "the Foreign Ministry believes that such a force could serve Israel's interest if it carries out effective security work in Gaza."<sup>25</sup>

In recent years, the Palestinian leadership has also voiced increasing support for NATO involvement in the MEPP. In a December 2013 letter to President Barack Obama, Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas called for the indefinite deployment of an American-led NATO force, with troops throughout the Palestinian state, along with the Palestinian police and other security units.<sup>26</sup>

Among the other international supporters and promoters of the idea of NATO peacekeeping forces as part of an Israeli–Palestinian agreement are columnists Thomas Friedman and Robert Kagan, as well as others such as former UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan, former German Foreign Minister Joschka Fischer, former US Secretary of State Colin Powell, and former US Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel.<sup>27</sup>

Although Israeli political and military elites are following the transatlantic relationship, many of them also share the general public's third perception that NATO is not "really" a Euro-Atlantic alliance but rather either an "American organization" or a "European group of nations." That said, it is important to emphasize that the Israeli political and military elites are not unified in their approach to NATO. This group is actually divided into three categories: the political elite, decision makers and diplomats, and the military elite.

In analyzing Israeli political and military elites, I conducted fifty face-to-face interviews with ministers, members of Knesset, senior officials, and decision makers in relevant ministries, as well as with senior Israel Defense Forces (IDF) officers. While it is safe to conclude that generally speaking, the Israeli military elite perceives NATO to be an American-led military organization (with a European component) that also employs political instruments, Israeli decision makers and diplomats perceive NATO to be a European-led political organization (with American and Canadian components) that also uses hard power. As for the Israeli political elite, the distinctions between "American" and "European" tend to cut across "top" and "bottom" tiers: The "top tier" of this group (prime minister and ministers) tends to perceive NATO as an American-led military organization, while the "bottom tier" of this group (members of Knesset) sees NATO as a European-led political organization.

### **Understanding Israeli Perceptions of NATO**

It is easy to understand the general public's perception that NATO presents a hospitable framework for Israeli accession, and therefore that Israel could and should join the Alliance within the foreseeable future. Such a view can be explained by popular perceptions of Israel as a regional—perhaps for some even global—strategic player, by its affiliation with Western global powers, as well as wishful thinking. What is surprising is the degree to which senior Israeli officials, along with European and US leaders, policy makers, and others who are familiar with NATO, cling to this idea. For such perceptions about Israeli accession to NATO ignore fundamental incongruities between Israel's strategy of "self-reliance," under which the Jewish State can and must defend its territorial sovereignty on its own, on the one hand, and NATO's guiding principle of "alliance reliance," on the other.

Even if we were to ignore such fundamental factors as Israel's deeply suspicious attitude toward international organizations, as well as its semi-pariah status in most of them, Israel's geopolitical reality makes it, at least in the short/mid-term, exceptional and radically different from all other NATO member countries.

Throughout its history, Israel has maintained deterrence through conventional power, implicit nuclear capability, and power projection.<sup>28</sup> Israeli accession to

NATO would clearly require Israel to undergo a fundamental transformation on a number of fronts, such as reaching a comprehensive and final-status peace agreement with the Palestinians, being willing to place its trust in NATO's security assurances, and ratifying the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. Accepting this deterrence strategy and forsaking the pillars that underpin the country's very *raison d'être* and traditional survival strategy would present great obstacles for Israeli accession to NATO, even if Israel were invited to join the Alliance.

Moreover, Israeli membership in the Alliance is not really an option for NATO's top officials. Indeed, NATO military and senior officials are either publicly advocating against Israeli membership in the Alliance or do not even seem to consider such a possibility in the first place. As former Chief of the US Central Command, and, as such, an important player within NATO's military ranks, General David Petraeus said in a hearing at the US Senate Armed Services Committee when asked about a possible Israeli attack in Iran: "[Such attack] will prove why Israel should not be a full member in NATO. As a NATO member Israel will not be able to go on its own on such an adventure against Iran."<sup>29</sup>

One of the problems with the Israeli perception that the country might become a full member of NATO, especially when voiced by senior Israeli officials, is that it potentially undermines the very foundations of the Israeli–NATO relationship. Such a fallacy in Israel's foreign and security policy creates unrealistic expectations, which are bound to lead to a sense of frustration on the part of Jerusalem, as well as to built-in misunderstandings between the two partners.<sup>30</sup> In addition, it introduces a false variable into the very heart of Israel's long-term strategic thinking.

The problem with the second Israeli perception—that NATO should be involved in the MEPP and should send troops to the region in a peacekeeping capacity—is that it is incongruent with Israel's national ethos of self-reliance. Self-reliance has been a fundamental pillar in Israel's national security doctrine since its 1948 War of Independence. This means that it must never need to ask foreign forces—including American soldiers—to risk their lives in its defense. It is also rooted in Israel's understanding that if it lost the ability to defend itself on its own, it would lose its very *raison d'être*, which is to be able to guarantee the security of the Jews in their own national home.<sup>31</sup>

Not only, therefore, does the second perception ignore Israel's fundamental national security ethos (and its correlative assumption that international peacekeepers, no matter what, will eventually betray this country),<sup>32</sup> but it also goes against important voices within the Israeli military elite that maintain that it would be better not to deploy a friendly force on Israel's borders as long as the region remains unstable. The argument is that the involvement of foreign forces

in the defense of Israel would introduce inevitable tensions into Israel's relations with these friendly countries, which for understandable reasons would be much more sensitive to the safety of their soldiers than to Israel's security.<sup>33</sup>

For NATO, the deployment of troops would seemingly advance its quest to remain a relevant global player in the post-Cold War world. And yet while the value of such a role would be chiefly symbolic, the risks are real. Even assuming perfect security conditions and no loss of lives, such a role would be bound to undermine NATO's relations both with Israel and other Middle Eastern/Arab partners. NATO forces on the ground would have to adopt strict neutrality between the parties—a position that is hard to see NATO maintain without the Alliance effectively downgrading its current level of relations and cooperation with both Israel and the Arab countries.

The third Israeli perception, according to which the organization is not a Euro-Atlantic alliance, but rather either an American-led military organization (with a European component) that also employs political instruments, or a European-led political organization (with American and Canadian components) that also uses hard power, reveals the deep lack of understanding of NATO on the part of the Israeli public and political and military elites. Not only does the general public hold this perception (with over 50 percent of Israelis unaware that the organization is a Euro-Atlantic alliance), but so do, to a large extent, the country's elites. Thus, for the military elite, NATO is an American-led military organization (with a European component) and, as the argument goes, "that is exactly why it is so hospitable toward Israel."<sup>34</sup> Accordingly, Israel should seek to get closer to this organization "because we can really learn from the Americans. The European members of NATO have simply nothing to offer us."<sup>35</sup>

By contrast, Israeli decision makers and diplomats tend to perceive NATO as a European-led political organization (with American and Canadian components). Such a perception fuels the argument among these elites that stronger relations with the Alliance could eventually lead to deeper relations with the otherwise "hostile" EU. Indeed, to the extent that the US is part of this Alliance, it can help Israel strengthen its relations with NATO with a view toward eventual Israeli accession to the EU.

## Conclusions

In his seminal work *Perception and Misperception in International Politics*, Robert Jervis links images and perceptions to the behavior of actors in external affairs. Jervis argues that "it is often impossible to explain crucial decisions and policies without reference to the decision makers' beliefs about the world and their images of others," and therefore that it is crucial to examine perceptions in

international relations because they “help explain many seemingly incomprehensible policies.”<sup>36</sup>

Three key perceptions underlying Israeli–NATO relations have been identified and analyzed here. The first was that NATO represents a hospitable framework for Israeli accession, and therefore Israel could and should join the Alliance within the foreseeable future. An additional perception, which might complement the first one, is that NATO should be involved in the MEPP and that it should send troops to the region in a peacekeeping capacity. The third fundamental perception might contradict the other two and reveals the deep lack of understanding of the Israeli public and elites about NATO: The organization is not perceived as a Euro-Atlantic alliance, but rather either as an American-led military organization or a European-led political group of nations.

However problematic some of these perceptions and images might be, it is crucial to bear in mind that they are likely to affect relations between Israel and NATO and the interaction between these two partners. If Israel seeks to continue developing, deepening, strengthening, and even upgrading its relations with NATO, it should make a greater effort to understand, and in some cases even dispel, its own perceptions of the Alliance, on which the future of Israeli–NATO relations ultimately lies.

## Notes

This article draws on the author’s *Normative Power Europe Meets Israel: Perceptions and Realities* (Lanham, 2015). The author would like to thank Sabina Gendler and Ron Zydel for their invaluable research assistance in the preparation of this article.

- <sup>1</sup> The Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung (KAS) and Pardo 2016 national survey was carried out in January by Keevoon Global Research. A representative sample of 1,000 people responded to the survey, with a margin of error of 2.25 percent.
- <sup>2</sup> Sharon Pardo, “The Year that Israel Considered Joining the European Economic Community,” *Journal of Common Market Studies*, LI: 5 (September, 2013), 901–15.
- <sup>3</sup> The Baghdad Pact of 1955, which was signed by Iran, Iraq, Turkey, Pakistan, and the United Kingdom, was designed to bar the penetration of the ideological and political forces of the Russo–Chinese alliance. The Pact was conceived as an extension and completion of the NATO wall.
- <sup>4</sup> Shimon Peres, *David’s Sling* (New York, 1970), p. 147.
- <sup>5</sup> Itamar Rabinovitch, “Israel and the Western Alliance,” *The Middle East and the Western Alliance*, Steven L. Spiegel (ed.) (London, 1982), pp. 197–206.
- <sup>6</sup> Janice Gross Stein, “Alice in Wonderland: The North Atlantic Alliance and the Arab–Israeli Dispute,” *ibid*, pp. 49–81.

- <sup>7</sup> Panayiotis Ifestos, *European Political Cooperation: Towards a Framework of Supranational Diplomacy?* (Aldershot, 1987).
- <sup>8</sup> Sharon Pardo and Joel Peters, *Uneasy Neighbors: Israel and the European Union* (Lanham, 2010).
- <sup>9</sup> Yosef Govrin, *Israel's Relations with the East European States: From Disruption to Resumption* (Middlesex, 2011); Martin van Creveld, "NATO, Israel and Peace in the Middle East," *NATO Review* (Autumn 2005), [www.nato.int/docu/review/2005/Middle-East/Peace-Middle-East-Israel/EN/index.htm](http://www.nato.int/docu/review/2005/Middle-East/Peace-Middle-East-Israel/EN/index.htm).
- <sup>10</sup> Friends of Israel Initiative and The Henry Jackson Society, *Added Value: Israel's Strategic Worth to the European Union and its Member States* (London, 2014). In October 2006, Israel and NATO concluded an Individual Cooperation Program (ICP), making Israel the first country outside the Euro-Atlantic region, and the first MD country, to conclude such an agreement. The ICP provides a long-term plan for cooperation in twenty-seven areas and it opens the door for Israeli–NATO cooperation in various fields.
- <sup>11</sup> The survey was carried out in April 2009 by Keevoon Global Research. A representative sample of 600 people responded to the survey, with a margin of error of 4.1 percent.
- <sup>12</sup> My 2011 national survey was conducted by Panels Research in mid-June 2011. A representative sample of 1,057 people responded to the survey, with a 3.3 percent margin of error. My 2013 national survey was carried out in April and May 2013, also by Panels Research, and included a representative sample of 561 people with a margin of error of 4.3 percent. These two surveys were made possible thanks to the financial assistance of the German–Israeli Foundation for Scientific Research and Development. My 2014 national survey was conducted in February and March 2014 also by Panels Research. A representative sample of 572 people responded to the survey, with a margin of error of 4.2 percent. The KAS and Pardo 2016 national survey was conducted in early January (see note 1).
- <sup>13</sup> Benjamin Netanyahu, "Israel and NATO," *Congress Monthly*, 74, (Washington, DC, September–October, 2007).
- <sup>14</sup> Tzipi Livni, "Address by FM Livni: Remarks before the NATO–Israel Symposium," October 22, 2007.
- <sup>15</sup> "Avigdor Liberman: Israel Should Press to Join NATO, EU," *Haaretz*, January 1, 2007.
- <sup>16</sup> Yisrael Beytenu, "Yisrael Beytenu: Our Vision," (2009), p. 13.
- <sup>17</sup> Ronald S. Lauder, "Warum Israel Mitglied der NATO werden muss," *Die Welt*, February 7, 2011.
- <sup>18</sup> José Aznar, "Europe's Response to the Threat of Global Terror," Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs, *Jerusalem Issue Brief*, V:23 (Jerusalem, April, 2006).
- <sup>19</sup> House of Representatives, "110th Congress, 1st Session, H. Res. 235," March 9, 2007.
- <sup>20</sup> Yehoshua Justus, "Stevenson Proposes NATO's Guarantees," *Maariv*, December 5, 1957.
- <sup>21</sup> Jaap de Hoop Scheffer, "Speech by NATO Secretary-General," February 24, 2005.
- <sup>22</sup> Uri Yablonka, "Liberman's Plan: NATO instead of the Israel Defense Forces in Gaza," [Hebrew] nrg website, January 14, 2007.

- <sup>23</sup> Roni Sofer, "Liberman Leaves for Europe to Promote NATO's Deployment in the Strip," Ynet [Hebrew], June 25, 2007, <http://www.ynet.co.il/articles/0,7340,L-3417017,00.html>.
- <sup>24</sup> Roni Sofer, "Liberman Document: NATO in the Territories and Population Exchanges," [Hebrew] Ynet, October 28, 2007, <http://www.ynet.co.il/articles/0,7340,L-3464644,00.html>.
- <sup>25</sup> Barak Ravid, "Foreign Ministry Proposes International Force in Gaza," [Hebrew] *Haaretz*, September 7, 2014.
- <sup>26</sup> Thomas Friedman, "Abbas's NATO Proposal," *The New York Times*, February 2, 2014.
- <sup>27</sup> Robert Kagan, "Can NATO Patrol Palestine?" *The Washington Post*, April 18, 2002; Chuck Hagel, "NATO Expands its Boundaries," *USA Today*, March 1, 2004.
- <sup>28</sup> Shibley Telhami, "The Ties that Bind," *Foreign Affairs*, LXXXIII: 2 (2004), 353–58.
- <sup>29</sup> Dana Zimmerman, "Opens an Eye at the Age of 60," *Ynet*, April 2, 2009.
- <sup>30</sup> See also Marvin Liebstone, "Israel–NATO Relations: A Chain of Truths," *The Israel Journal of Foreign Affairs*, I: 3 (2007), 43–46.
- <sup>31</sup> Yaakov Amidror, "The Risks of Foreign Peacekeeping Forces in the West Bank," *Israel's Critical Security Requirements for Defensible Borders: The Foundation for a Viable Peace*, Dan Diker (ed.) (Jerusalem, 2011), pp. 80–9, 80, 86.
- <sup>32</sup> *Ibid*, p. 80.
- <sup>33</sup> *Ibid*, p. 86.
- <sup>34</sup> Interview with a senior IDF officer, Tel Aviv, July 3, 2013.
- <sup>35</sup> Interview with a senior IDF officer, Tel Aviv, June 12, 2013.
- <sup>36</sup> Robert Jervis, *Perception and Misperception in International Politics* (Princeton, 1976), pp. 28–9.